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INTRODUCTION 
The most famous line from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School 
District is that “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers 
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”1 People who know only this line from Tinker—and 
the victory it gave to the Vietnam-war protesting students—likely think 
of it as an incredibly speech-protective decision. It turns out that although 
Tinker contains lofty language about the importance of student speech 
rights, it sowed the seeds for the erosion of those very same rights. In the 
 
* Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, University of North Carolina 
School of Law. 
1 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
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past fifty years, First Amendment protection for student speech rights in 
K-12 public schools has diminished substantially.  
The Tinker decision contained three main weaknesses that have 
undermined student speech rights. First, it erroneously assumed that it 
was clear that minors had speech rights outside of school. Fifty years later, 
it still remains unclear what rights minors have. This uncertainty has made 
it easier for the Court (and lower courts) to chip away at their First 
Amendment rights in subsequent decisions and has left students 
particularly vulnerable in this digital age to online speech restrictions. 
Second, Tinker held that the speech rights of students—whatever they 
might be—can be restricted based on considerations of “the special 
characteristics of the school environment.”2 With this qualification, the 
Court essentially announced that student speech rights are not subject to 
the same standards that normally apply when the government regulates 
speech. This leaves the Court free in future cases to develop ad hoc rules 
restricting student speech. The third weakness of Tinker is that the Court 
embraced a standard permitting the restriction of student speech 
whenever school officials reasonably forecast that the speech would cause 
“material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline.”3 
This standard is unnecessarily deferential to school administrators and 
poses precisely the sort of censorship that the Court would never tolerate 
outside of the school setting.  
 I. FIRST PROBLEM: DO CHILDREN HAVE A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT  
TO SPEAK?  
When I was writing my first article on student speech rights,4 I had an 
eye-opening conversation with another constitutional law scholar5 who 
 
2 Id.  
3 Id. at 511. The Court also said that the school can restrict speech that constitutes an 
“invasion of the rights of others,” but this prong has received little judicial attention, and its 
meaning remains unclear. Id. at 513; see, e.g., Doe v. Valencia Coll., 903 F.3d 1220, 1229–31 
(11th Cir. 2018) (applying the “rights of others” prong to a college student in a harassment 
case); Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
whatever this phrase means, it covers a threatened school shooting); Saxe v. State College 
Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The precise scope of Tinker’s ‘interference 
with the rights of others’ language is unclear.”). 
4 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 1027 
(2008). 
5 This conversation was with John Garvey, who has grappled with some of these questions 
in his own work. See, e.g., John Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 
321 (1979). 
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asked me why I had presumed that minors had any First Amendment 
rights. After all, this professor explained, children are subject to the 
authority of their parents except in the most limited of situations. In 
addition, because children cannot vote, one of the key theories for free 
speech—to promote self-government—does not apply to their expression, 
at least not in the same way it applies to adults.6 
This line of inquiry caught me flat-footed, and I scrambled to add an 
entire section to my article to justify my assumption that minors had 
robust First Amendment rights.7 As I worked on this new section, I 
quickly realized that the scholar had a point—the Court has not been very 
clear about whether children have First Amendment expressive rights, or 
what any such rights look like. Instead, the Court has focused on the right 
of parents to raise their kids without undue interference from the 
government,8 or on protecting minors from the harmful speech of others.9  
This is problematic because when Tinker declared that it “has been the 
unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years” that children and 
teachers do not shed their rights to the freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate, the Court implied that it was clear what rights 
children (and government employees like public school teachers) had to 
speak outside of the schoolhouse gates.10 This turns out not to be true at 
all. Furthermore, it is incorrect to assume the Court meant to say much of 
anything about the rights of minors outside of school. Although Tinker 
provided a long string cite of cases to support its famous statement,11 it 
turns out that none of these cases concern the rights of minors to speak. 
Instead, a review of the cases Tinker cited after its famous “schoolhouse 
 
6 These arguments are very similar to the arguments Justice Thomas has made in recent 
student speech cases. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 821 (2011) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The practices and beliefs of the founding generation establish that 
‘the freedom of speech,’ as originally understood, does not include a right to speak to minors 
(or a right of minors to access speech) without going through the minors' parents or 
guardians.”); id. at 836 (“Although much has changed in this country since the Revolution, 
the notion that parents have authority over their children and that the law can support that 
authority persists today.”); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410–11 (2007) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (declaring that Tinker is “without basis in the Constitution” because “the history 
of public education suggests that the First Amendment, as originally understood, does not 
protect student speech in public schools”).  
7 See Papandrea, supra note 4, at 1076–89 (discussing various justifications for restricting 
the speech rights of K-12 public school students). 
8 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972).  
9 See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639–40 (1968). 
10 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
11 Id. at 506–07. 
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gate” sentence reveals that the Court was saying something quite 
unremarkable and hardly worthy of celebration—that public schools are 
not First-Amendment-free zones.   
Indeed, most cases Tinker cited involving minors and the First 
Amendment are really cases about the right of parents to raise their 
children without undue interference from the government. For example, 
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court struck down a law requiring 
students to attend public school because it conflicted with the right of 
parents to choose a school for their children.12 Some of the other decisions 
Tinker cited involved the Establishment Clause,13 and many involved the 
First Amendment rights of teachers, including some college professors.14  
The strongest case Tinker cited for meaningful student speech rights is 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.15 In this case, the 
Court made several statements suggesting that the students themselves 
had robust First Amendment rights.16 In addition, the Court suggested that 
the school can restrict speech or compel speech only if it can satisfy the 
“clear and present danger” test, the same test that would apply outside of 
the school setting to adults.17 Notably, though, Barnette involves 
compelled speech. The Court has recently recognized that compelled 
speech is arguably worse than restrictions on what can be said because 
“[w]hen speech is compelled . . . individuals are coerced into betraying 
their convictions.”18 Compelled speech in elementary school raises even 
 
12 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (holding that the law “unreasonably interferes with the 
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control”). Three years after Tinker, the Court held that states could not require Amish families 
to send their children to public or private school after completion of the eighth grade, 
explaining that “the values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of 
their children in their early and formative years have a high place in our society.” Yoder, 406 
U.S. at 213–14. 
13 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506–07; see, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (striking 
down a program of daily prayer in New York’s public schools); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1948) (holding unconstitutional a 
program of religious instruction conducted during the school day to public school students).  
14 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506–07 (citing several First Amendment cases involving public school 
teachers and professors).  
15 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
16 Id. at 631 (noting that the law punishes both parents and children, and “[t]he latter stand 
on a right of self-determination in matters that touch individual opinion and personal 
attitude”). 
17 Id. at 633–34. 
18 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 
(2018). 
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more concerns. In Barnette, Justice Jackson criticized the pledge as a 
“short-cut” to “arouse[] loyalties” to the nation rather than the “slow and 
easily neglected route” to patriotism that comes from studying American 
history.19 In addition, coercing children to repeat a state message 
potentially has more serious deleterious effects on them than it would on 
an adult.20 Barnette does not hold that students have an affirmative right 
to speak; instead, it holds that schools cannot force students to speak.21  
Furthermore, when the Court decided Tinker, it failed to grapple with 
its own recent decision suggesting that minors do not have robust speech 
rights. As Justice Stewart points out in his Tinker concurrence, the Court 
had decided Ginsberg v. New York just one year before Tinker.22 In 
Ginsberg, which upheld a New York law banning the sale of materials 
obscene for minors, the Court refused “to consider the impact of the 
guarantees of freedom of expression upon the totality of the relationship 
of the minor and the State.”23 Nevertheless, the Court readily concluded 
that whatever rights minors had, they were not the same as the rights of 
adults.24 The Court was less concerned with the rights of minors than with 
the rights their parents had to control what their children saw, stating that 
the Court has “consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to authority 
in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in 
the structure of our society.”25 Because the law did not prevent parents or 
guardians from giving their children access to the proscribed materials, 
the Court upheld the law as permissively controlling what minors could 
view without unduly interfering with parents’ rights.26 One possible way 
of viewing Tinker is that it was cabined in the State’s ability to interfere 
with parental choices, not that it was defending the rights of children 
themselves.27  
 
19 319 U.S. at 631 (footnote omitted). 
20 See Garvey, supra note 5, at 328 (noting that compelled speech poses greater harms to 
children than censorship of speech). 
21 319 U.S. at 642.  
22 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
23 Id. at 633, 636. 
24 Id. at 638 (“[W]e have recognized that even where there is an invasion of protected 
freedoms ‘the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope 
of its authority over adults . . . .’” (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 
(1944))).  
25 Id. at 639. 
26 Id. 
27 See, e.g., Sheerin N.S. Haubenreich, Parental Rights in MySpace: Reconceptualizing the 
State’s Parens Patriae Role in the Digital Age, 31 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 223, 232 
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Most of the Court’s free speech decisions involving minors before and 
after Tinker concern efforts to protect children from harmful speech.28 
Although the Court has made clear that “only in relatively narrow and 
well-defined circumstances may government bar public dissemination of 
protected materials to them,”29 the Court has never wholesale abandoned 
the general principle that the government can restrict the speech minors 
access in order to promote their proper development. In Erznoznik v. City 
of Jacksonville, for example, the Court struck down a ban on the showing 
of films containing nudity in drive-in theaters. Although one rationale for 
the ordinance was to protect minors, the Court declared that legislatures 
could not ban speech for minors based on vague ideas about what is 
unsuitable for them.30 But even in reaching this speech-protective 
conclusion, the Court continued to embrace the idea that some restrictions 
are permissible. In a footnote in Erznoznik, the Court quotes Tinker’s 
statement that the rights of minors are not co-extensive with the rights of 
adults, and cites Ginsberg for the proposition that sometimes speech 
restrictions are permissible to protect minors who are “captive 
audience[s]” or because they are deemed to lack “full capacity for 
individual choice” that is the premise of full First Amendment rights.31 
The Court’s more recent violent video games decision, Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, likewise rejected the idea that 
legislatures can restrict material minors can access at will, but the Court 
did not overrule Ginsberg to reach its conclusion.32 
As a result, to this day, it is not entirely clear what First Amendment 
rights students have outside of the schoolhouse gates. The Court has not 
clearly distinguished between the rights of children to speak and the rights 
of children to consume speech of others.33 Although the Court has made 
 
(2009) (citing Tinker to support statement that “[p]arents must address school issues that 
conflict with their child-rearing decisions and schools must likewise address parental choices 
that conflict with curricular decisions.”).  
28 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (upholding restrictions on 
indecent broadcasts in part because “broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even 
those too young to read”). 
29 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975). 
30 Id. at 213–14. 
31 Id. at 214 & n.11 (stating that “[i]n most circumstances” the government cannot restrict 
the speech minors hear, but then citing Tinker and Ginsberg). 
32 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
33 See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children from Speech, 79 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 
3, 5 (2004) (explaining at the outset of his article that it is focusing “on the right to ‘consume’ 
speech rather than to produce it. The main question is not whether children should be entitled 
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statements in some of its student speech cases that minors have speech 
rights outside of the schoolhouse gates, these statements are entirely dicta 
and have not been reconciled with Ginsberg’s suggestion that children do 
not have the same First Amendment rights as adults outside of the school 
setting.34  
One possible response to concerns that the Court has failed to define 
minor speech rights is to reject the dichotomy between the right to speak 
and the right to receive speech. Instead, one potential view of the Court’s 
student speech cases is that they consistently concern when schools can 
regulate speech to protect the listeners in the audience (i.e., other 
students). In Tinker, the armband-wearing students did not pose any risk 
of harm to their fellow students with their political views about the 
Vietnam War, and therefore their expression could not be restricted.35 In 
its later cases, however, the Court has concluded that the harm certain 
types of student speech cause the audience justifies its restriction. In 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, for example, the Court 
abandoned Tinker’s instruction that schools must tolerate unpopular 
speech to hold that schools can prohibit sexually explicit, indecent, or 
lewd speech at school in order to protect other students.36 The Court 
explained that the “fundamental values” of a civil society are not limited 
to the freedom of expression but instead “must also take into account 
consideration of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a school, 
the sensibilities of fellow students.”37 The Court noted that in legislative 
bodies across the country, politicians are forbidden from using 
“expressions offensive to other participants in the debate.”38 Bethel also 
mentions that the student’s sexually suggestive election speech “was 
acutely insulting to teenage girl[s]  . . . many of whom were only 14 years 
 
to make movies, produce CDs, and so on, but whether their access to the harmful content 
found in some cultural materials should be limited.”). 
34 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (“Had Fraser delivered the same 
speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would have been protected.”); 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (“A school need not tolerate 
student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission’ even though the 
government could not censor similar speech outside the school.” (citation omitted)). 
35 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–11 (1969) (noting 
the school did not restrict all political speech and instead singled out the students wearing the 
black armbands on the basis of their viewpoint opposing the war).  
36 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986). 
37 Id. at 681. 
38 Id. at 681. 
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old and on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality.”39 To drive the 
point home, the Court cited several other decisions in which it has 
restricted offensive, lewd, or vulgar speech to protect minors, including 
Ginsberg, Board of Education v. Pico, and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.40 
In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier41 and Morse v. Frederick,42 the Court likewise 
expressed concern about the impact of speech on observers. The 
Hazelwood Court noted that  
“a school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of 
the intended audience in determining whether to disseminate student 
speech on potentially sensitive topics, which might range from the 
existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school setting to the 
particulars of teenage sexual activity in a high school setting.”43   
In Morse, the Court held that “schools may take steps to safeguard those 
entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as 
encouraging illegal drug use.”44  
It is not clear, though, why student speech rights should be defined in 
terms of whether the speech is potentially harmful to minors, especially 
when the Court has been so deferential to arguments about harm. This 
deference stands in sharp contrast to the Court’s approach to speech 
restrictions outside of the school setting, where the Court has shown some 
willingness to second-guess government claims that speech is harmful to 
children. 45 Indeed, in Hazelwood, the Court went so far as to hold that in 
the context of school-sponsored expressive activities, schools have 
virtually unbridled power to restrict student speech to protect the student 
audience from “potentially sensitive topics.”46 The only showing that a 
 
39 Id. at 683. 
40 Id. at 684–85. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan points out that there was no evidence 
in the record that any students found the student’s speech insulting, and the suggestive speech 
came nowhere close to the explicit language at issue in Ginsberg or Pacifica. Id. at 689 n.2 
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). 
41 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
42 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
43 484 U.S. at 272. 
44 551 U.S. at 397. 
45 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011) (striking down law 
banning the sale of certain violent video games to minors); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 
422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975) (rejecting the government’s argument that a ban on all drive-in 
movies with nudity was necessary to protect children, explaining that “[c]learly all nudity 
cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors.”). 
46 484 U.S. at 271–72.  
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school has to make is that the censorship serves a legitimate pedagogical 
concern.47 In that case, the Court upheld the school’s refusal to publish 
portions of the student newspaper that addressed teenage pregnancy, 
sighting the sensitivity of the younger high school students.48 The Court 
recognized that the article on teenage pregnancy contained no graphic 
content but mentioned “[students’] sexual histories and their use or 
nonuse of birth control.”49 The Court concluded that the school was “not 
unreasonable” to censor such “frank talk.”50 Most shockingly, in 
considering the relevant audience, the Court asserted that it included not 
only the actual students at the school but also “the students’ even younger 
brothers and sisters” who might read the newspaper.51 The Court also 
failed to explain why protecting students from speech on “sensitive 
topics” is justifiable in school,52 especially given that they are very likely 
hearing the same speech from their peers (and from others) when they are 
not at school. 
Without a more robust understanding of why children have First 
Amendment rights to speak when they are outside of the schoolhouse 
gates, it is no surprise subsequent Supreme Court decisions have limited 
those rights when they are inside those gates. By focusing on the potential 
harm to the audience in its post-Tinker cases, the Court dramatically 
curtails the rights of student speakers. It is time for the Court to recognize 
that students are people, too, and that they have affirmative rights to speak 
that cannot be so easily balanced away in the face of amorphous “harms.” 
II. SECOND PROBLEM: BALANCING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN LIGHT 
OF THE “SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT” 
In the same paragraph in Tinker where the Court declared that students 
have First Amendment rights within the schoolhouse gates, the Court 
stated that these constitutional rights (whatever they might be) must be 
balanced against the need “for affirming the comprehensive authority of 
the States and school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional 
safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”53 
 
47 Id. at 273.  
48 Id. at 274–75.  
49 Id. at 274.  
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 274–75.  
52 Id. at 272.  
53 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). 
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Accordingly, in a dramatic departure from its usual method of First 
Amendment analysis, Tinker embraces a balancing approach to free 
speech rights in public schools. Whatever free speech rights students (or 
teachers) might have in the abstract are essentially balanced against the 
need to restrict speech “in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment.”54 This balancing approach has led directly to the Court’s 
subsequent decisions that systematically undervalue student speech and 
overvalue the interests of school administrators in maintaining civility 
and good order. Most disturbingly, the Court inappropriately permits 
schools to restrict student speech based on the unexamined assertion that 
onlookers assume schools endorse any speech that they do not censor.  
Several scholars support the Court’s institution-specific approach to 
student-speech restrictions,55 and to some extent, it makes sense to 
recognize that schools need to have some power to restrict speech in order 
to achieve their educational mission. This deference, however, is much 
more appropriate in the classroom than it is on the playground or cafeteria, 
or with respect to speech online. In the classroom, teachers necessarily 
must have the authority to engage in content-based and even viewpoint-
based speech regulations.56 The selection of course materials and 
assignments, and effective class discussions, demand this level of 
control.57 And it is not just K-12 schools that require this level of 
authority. University professors and school officials require it as well. As 
Justice Stevens once explained with respect to universities, “[t]hey select 
books for inclusion in the library, they hire professors on the basis of their 
academic philosophies, they select courses for inclusion in the 
curriculum, and they reward scholars for what they have written.”58 
Outside of the classroom, however, it is much less clear that it is essential 
for schools to have broad powers to regulate student speech.  
 
54 Id. at 506.  
55 See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, First Amendment Institutions 18–19 (2013) (arguing that courts 
should largely defer to First Amendment institutions like schools to “give them room to 
develop their own visions of what the First Amendment means, even if that vision is different 
from the one courts would choose themselves” (emphasis omitted)).  
56 See R. George Wright, School-Sponsored Speech and the Surprising Case for Viewpoint-
Based Regulations, 31 S. Ill. U. L.J. 175, 212–13 (2007). 
57 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 (“Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over 
this second form of student expression to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the 
activity is designed to teach . . . .”). 
58 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
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Since Tinker, the Court has embraced the arguments of school officials 
that the toleration of speech is equivalent to approval of that speech. In 
other words, a student’s expressive activities pose more of a threat to his 
peers when he speaks at school because that speech will have more impact 
on them when teachers and administrators let speech go unpunished and 
unregulated. Bethel School District v. No. 403 Fraser, Hazelwood v. 
Kuhlmeier, and Morse v. Frederick all suggest that a minor’s First 
Amendment rights must give way to the interest of school officials in 
avoiding any association with their speech and perceptions that they 
tacitly approve of such speech. In Bethel, for example, the Court 
concluded that “it was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate 
itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct 
is wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school 
education.”59 Hazelwood held that schools can censor student speech in 
school-sponsored activities “that students, parents, and members of the 
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”60 
In Morse, the Court explained that it is hard to keep children away from 
drugs “when the norms in school appear to tolerate such behavior.”61 
Unless the school punished the student waving the “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS Banner,” the Court asserts, students might get the wrong idea that 
school officials endorsed his message.62 As the Court explained, “Student 
speech celebrating illegal drug use at a school event, in the presence of 
school administrators and teachers, thus poses a particular challenge for 
school officials working to protect those entrusted to their care from the 
dangers of drug abuse.”63 
The Court’s willingness to accept schools’ arguments that tolerating 
student speech amounts to endorsement is not consistent with most of the 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence in other contexts, but it is 
representative of the general “creep” of the government speech doctrine.64 
In most of its First Amendment cases, particularly those involving the 
public forum, the Court does not accept arguments that reasonable 
observers would believe that the government sanctions the speech of 
 
59 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986). 
60 484 U.S. at 271.  
61 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. (emphasis added). 
64 For a lengthier discussion of this topic, see Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Government 
Brand, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1195, 1226–33 (2016). 
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private actors merely by permitting speech to occur.65 If this were not the 
case, the government would be able to regulate any speech it does not like 
that occurs on government property. The Court appears to accept 
uncritically that whenever a school tolerates speech, students will think 
that the school endorses it. But as Justice O'Connor once said, “The 
proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to censor is 
not complicated.”66 It is hard to imagine, for example, that students 
actually thought the school endorsed Fraser’s election speech, Frederick’s 
banner, or even the news articles in Hazelwood. Relatedly, the Court also 
fails to consider whether schools could engage in counter speech or at 
least more speech to address any misconceptions about government 
endorsement.67  
In evaluating whether the “special characteristics of the school 
environment” give educators constitutional dispensation to regulate 
student speech, the Court should be leery of arguments that toleration 
equals endorsement. These arguments are persuasive in the classroom 
setting, but they are not persuasive in most other contexts. Students are 
smarter than that. The Court should examine more critically claims that 
reasonable observers—particularly students—would think that school 
officials approve of their classmates’ expressive activities. 
III. THIRD PROBLEM: DEFERENCE TO SCHOOL OFFICIALS 
Tinker declared that school authorities can regulate speech when there 
are “facts which might reasonably have led [them] to forecast substantial 
disruption of or material interference with school activities.”68 This 
standard contains at least two elements that contribute to a potentially 
devastating reduction of student speech rights. First, the standard defers 
to the “reasonable” interpretations of what speech means and how it will 
impact the school environment. Second, it allows school officials to act 
long before any substantial disruption actually occurs. As a result, student 
 
65 See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763–65 (1995). 
66 Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).  
67 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 289 (1988) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Court should have considered whether a disclaimer in the student 
newspaper, or an official response clarifying the school’s position on a particular topic, would 
alleviate any confusion about whether the school endorsed the student speech appearing in the 
school newspaper). 
68 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).  
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speech rights rest less on a judicially enforceable First Amendment right 
and more on the willingness of school administrators to tolerate speech.  
The facts of Tinker come pretty close to a perfect vehicle for a decision 
recognizing student speech rights. Not only were the plaintiffs engaged in 
core political speech, but they also engaged in that speech silently. Their 
expression did not involve the assertion of any false facts; nor did it 
threaten any sort of harm to others. Furthermore, only seven out of 18,000 
students in the entire school system wore black armbands.69 As the Court 
expressly stated, this was not a case involving “aggressive, disruptive 
action or even group demonstrations.”70 The record contained “no 
evidence whatever of petitioners’ interference, actual or nascent, with the 
schools’ work or of collision with the rights of other[s].”71 Instead, the 
school punished the students for “a silent, passive expression of opinion, 
unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of 
petitioners.”72 School officials claimed they feared disruption would 
result from the armbands, but the Court called this out as an 
“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” based on “an 
urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might result from the 
expression” opposing the Vietnam War.73 In addition, the school officials 
could not credibly argue that they hoped to keep all politically 
controversial subjects out of the school because it permitted other forms 
of political expression, including political campaign buttons as well as the 
Iron Cross, a symbol of Nazism.74 The Court then declared that public 
schools are not “enclaves of totalitarianism” and cannot treat students as 
“closed-circuit recipients of only that which the [school] chooses to 
communicate.”75  
Throughout its decision, the Court embraced core First Amendment 
principles. The Court rejected the heckler’s veto, noting that “[a]ny 
variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear” or “start an 
 
69 Id. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting). 
70 Id at 508 (majority opinion).  
71 Id.; see also id. at 514 (“[T]he record does not demonstrate any facts which might 
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material 
interference with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in 
fact occurred.”). 
72 Id. at 508. 
73 Id. at 508, 510. 
74 Id. at 510–11. 
75 Id. at 511. 
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argument or cause a disturbance.”76 Indeed, the Court said, the open 
debate the First Amendment fosters “is the basis of our national strength 
and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in 
this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.”77 The Court also 
emphasized that students learn not just in the classroom from their 
teachers but also from their fellow students on the “playing field” and in 
the cafeteria.78 
This soaring language reflecting a deep commitment to the marketplace 
of ideas has been the foundation for so many of the Court’s First 
Amendment cases, from incitement79 to defamation.80 Accordingly, the 
Court concluded, “[i]n the absence of a specific showing of 
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are 
entitled to freedom of expression of their views.”81 The Court also 
initially suggested that public schools, as government actors, will not be 
able to regulate student speech unless it causes a material and substantial 
disruption in the operation of the school.82 This standard sounds very 
similar to the test for incitement, which requires imminent lawless 
action.83 It also is not too far off from the tests for time, place, and manner 
restrictions, which permit government actors to impose content-neutral 
speech restrictions to serve important government interests.84  
But the facts of Tinker made it easy for the Court to dodge more 
complicated questions that have plagued student speech cases ever since. 
First, because the students’ armbands had virtually no impact on the 
operation of the school, the Court did not directly discuss whether 
reactions to student speech could constitute a valid “disruption” for 
purposes of its new test. Although the Court seemed to suggest that the 
 
76 Id. at 508. 
77 Id. at 508–09. 
78 Id. at 512–13 (“[P]ersonal intercommunication among the students . . . is also an 
important part of the educational process.”). 
79 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (“[T]he 
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or 
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action.”). 
80 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (citing “a profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open”). 
81 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
82 Id. at 509. 
83 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
84 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
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ban on the heckler’s veto applies with equal force to schools,85 it is also 
possible that the reaction could be so significant it would interfere with 
the operation of the school. Accordingly, there is an obvious disconnect 
between the assertion that a disruptive heckler’s veto can have no place 
in America, with a standard that permits restrictions on speech to avoid 
disruption.  
Second, the Court concluded its opinion by stating that “the record does 
not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school 
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference 
with school activities.”86 It is possible that the Court did not mean to water 
down its new material and substantial disruption test by suggesting that 
as long as it is “reasonable” for school officials to predict that speech 
would cause a disruption, they could restrict it. Instead, perhaps the Court 
simply meant to comment on the complete lack of disruption or threat of 
disruption in this particular case. It is also possible that the Court meant 
to suggest that it would not be necessary for speech to actually cause a 
material and substantial disruption in the operation of the schools as long 
as the disruption was about to occur. After all, the test for incitement does 
not require government officials to wait until unlawful conduct occurs but 
requires unlawful conduct to be “imminent.”87 
Regardless of what the Court actually meant, subsequent decisions 
have read this language as embracing a form of deference to school 
officials.88 This deference is not merely in determining what constitutes a 
material and substantial disruption but also deference to whether a 
disruption is likely to occur. It is also unclear what school officials can 
consider when making their predictions. For example, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit suggested it is permissible for schools to 
consider any history of disruption for perhaps the last century, and 
certainly for the last several decades.89 With this one sentence, the Court 
substantially waters down its otherwise potentially speech-protective 
standard.  
 
85 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
86 Id. at 514 (emphasis added). 
87 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
88 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007) (deferring to school official’s 
“reasonable” interpretation of the nonsensical phrase “Bong Hits for Jesus” as advocating 
illegal drug use). 
89 Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 438 (4th Cir. 2013) (upholding 
ban on confederate flags in schools after noting that “[o]ver the past four decades” there have 
been racial tensions).  
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CONCLUSION 
In the five decades since Tinker, the Court has backed away from some 
of the more robust statements in the opinion about the importance of 
student speech.90 This Essay argues that the evolution of the Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area can be traced back to various weaknesses and 
unresolved tensions in Tinker’s celebrated opinion. Without a more 
complete understanding about why minors have student speech rights, it 
is easier for courts to expand the authority of school officials and to 
restrict those rights even more. In addition, the Court needs to resist the 
“creep” of the government speech doctrine and recognize that students as 
well as the larger community do not equate (or at least do not reasonably 
equate) toleration of speech with endorsement of that speech. 
The tensions outlined in this Essay have particularly important 
ramifications for the current uncertainty regarding the ability of schools 
to restrict the speech of students online. Although the Court has yet to 
grapple with how to interpret Tinker in light of new technology, lower 
courts have embraced the Tinker “substantial disruption” standard to 
justify student speech restrictions both inside and outside of the 
schoolhouse gates.91 Given how deferential courts are to schools and 
dismissive of student rights, it would be very easy to water down those 
rights even when students are not at school.  
 
 
90 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 397 (holding school could punish speech it reasonably perceived 
as advocating illegal drug use); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) 
(holding school officials can censor student expression in school-sponsored activities as long 
as “their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”); Bethel Sch. Dist. 
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (holding public schools can restrict the use of 
lewd and profane language in order to promote “socially appropriate behavior”). 
91 See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 391–92 (5th Cir. 2015); D.J.M. 
ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2011). 
